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STICKING TO BUSINESS: A REVIEW OF
BUSINESS-RELATED CASES IN THE 1997-98
SUPREME COURT TERM*
Barbara K. Bucholtzt
The Supreme Court is not the Court of Final Consideration,... following every
term, there's always the law reviews.
I. INTRODUCTION
One defining characteristic of the Court's business-related opinions last term
was the absence of either radical departures from existing jurisprudence or bold
decisions implicating contentious public policy and divisive constitutional issues.2
Most of the business cases read like methodical exercises in statutory construction.3
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioners' Guide to the October 1997 Term ofthe United
States Supreme Court, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998.
' Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
!. Louis Henkin, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, remarks at A Roundtable on
Constitutionalism, Constitutional Rights and Changing Civil Society, November 19, 1998, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law.
2. To the extent that there was headline-grabbing drama in the business cases, it was to be found in the areas of
sexual harassment and discrimination. Foran expanded discussion, see Vicki J. Limas, Significant EmploymentLaw
Cases in the 1997-98 Term: A Clarification of Sexual Harassment Law and a Broad Definition of Disability, 34
TULSA LJ. 307 (1999).
In this term the Court clarified existing standards and sustained its intolerance of sexual harassment in the
workplace. In Oncale v. Sundowner OffShore Services, the Court held that the protections against workplace sexual
harassment under Title VII, extend to same-sex sexual harassment. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). In
Faragher v. City of Boca, and in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, the court enunciated new guidelines for determining
employer liability for supervisor harassment: employers are vicariously liable for actionable sexual harassment by a
supervisor that results in tangible employment consequences for the employee. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293
(1998); Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998). If no tangible effects on employment could have been
anticipated by the employee, the employer can raise its anti-harassment policy and its implementation of that policy as
an affirmative defense. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; Burlington Indus., 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
Discrimination in the workplace was also sanctioned under existing law this term. In Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., the Court found that an employee who signed a document releasing her employer from all claims was
not barred from bringing a subsequent claim for age discrimination because the release did not conform to the provisions
of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act. See Oubre, 118 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1998). Also, in Bragdon v. Abbott,
the Court held that an individual who tested positive for HIV was covered by the protective provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 2196,2213 (1998).
3. This is not to suggest that the outcomes of these exercises were foregone conclusions. For the definitive
discussion of the proposition that for every canon of statutory construction in support of one result there is an equal and
opposing canon which supports the opponent's view, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules on Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
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Indeed, the Court as a whole evinced a marked preference for conservatism, sticking
to the business of judicial restraint and reserving a cacophony of concurrences and
dissents only for those majority or plurality opinions in which the author strayed from
his or her assigned task of applying existing rules or ascertaining the legislative intent
of particular statutory language.4
Another notable characteristic of the term was that some of the decisions likely
to have the most significant impact on the business community were not, strictly
speaking, business law cases. One landmark decision5 applied the seldom-invoked
Eighth Amendment and found that compelling full forfeiture of unreported currency
carried by an international traveler violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Amendment.6 The case was important, because this was the Court's first application
4. See, e.g., Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998). The Court was asked
to construe the citizens' suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. See
id. at 1009. The specific issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to hear a case in which violations of the Act had
occurred but had been rectified before suit was filed. See id. All members of the Court concurred in Justice Scalia's
conclusion that a suit forviolations that had subsequently been rectified was barred underArticle III's standing analysis.
See id. at 1019-32.
However, three of the Justices found that statutory construction of the Act's citizen-suit provision was the
preferred ground for the decision. See id. at 1021-32. They expressly rejected Justice Scalia's insistence that the Court
reach beyond statutory interpretation and ground the decision upon an innovative constitutional theory that Article III
standing issues must be resolved at the outset. See id. at 1025-27 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurring justices
evinced a strong preference for statutory interpretation over unnecessary consideration of constitutional theory when,
as here, the intent of Congress expressed in the Act offered sufficient grounds for the dispute. See id. at 1021-27, 1030-
32.
Similarly, in Baker v. General Motors Corp., four concurring justices agreed with Justice Ginsburg's
conclusion that Article IV's Full Faith and Credit Clause did not extend beyond final judgments to reach an injunction.
See Baker, 118 S. Ct. 657,664 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, they opined that the existing doctrine was
sufficient to resolve the issue and they expressly refused to be led beyond the existing doctrine, and the narrow issue
before it, into unchartered Constitutional terrain and Justice Ginsburg's discourse on broad exceptions to the doctrine.
See id. at 672. Thus, Baker and Steel illustrate the present majority's minimalist approach of fashioning the issues
narrowly and its preference for resolving those issues on the deferential grounds ofstatutory construction and legislative
intent.
5. See United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
6. See id. A traveler and his family sought to board an airplane bound for Italy without notifying the customs
service that he was transporting more than $ 10,000 in currency. There was no dispute that this failure to report violated
31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A). See id. at 2031. In fact, the traveler carried with him $357,144 in currency. See id. at
2032. The government argued that the entire amount should be forfeited pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) which
provides in pertinent part, "The Court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section
... 5316 .... shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such
offense .. " See id. at 2031. The District Court found that the entire amount was subject to the statutory forfeiture
because it was "involved in" the offense, but they concluded that this forfeiture would violate the Eighth Amendment
because it was grossly disproportionate to the traveler's violation ofthe reporting statute at § 5316(a)(1)(A). See id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit split on the issue of whether the undisclosed currency was "involved in such
offense" as required by § 982(a)(I) because the traveler's offense was the failure to report thecurrency not the transport
of the currency. Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334,337 (9th Cir. 1996)). Thus, the appellate court
ruled that the forfeiture was perse unconstitutional. However, the Ninth Circuitdid affirm the District Court's decision,
but lacked jurisdiction to consider the District Court's reduced assessment of a $15,000 fine. See id. at 338,
The Supreme Court agreed that the forfeiture at issue violated the Excessive Fines Clause. See Bajakajian, 118
S. Ct. at 2035. Specifically, it found the forfeiture to be the type of "fine" contemplated by the Clause because it was
a payment to the government as a punishment for an offense. See id. at 2033 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. ofVt. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,265 (1989)). The Court agreed with the District Court that full forfeiture in this
case would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. See id. at 2034. In so ruling, it fashioned a gross disproportionality
test, instructing courts in application of the test of the "substantial deference" owed to the legislature in determining
appropriate punishments for offenses and the inherent imprecision of the courts in determining the proportionality
between crime and punishment. See id. at 2037. Applying the test to the instant case, the Court found that a forfeiture
of the entire amount transported, $357,144, would violate the Excessive Fines Clause, but it expressly refused to
2
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of the Excessive Fines Clause.7 It was of particular importance to the business
community because its application may not be limited to the kind of proceedings
against an individual at issue in BajakajianY but may extend to civil fines imposed
against businesses for failure to file reports under a variety of statutes. Indeed, the
Court expressly opened the door to excessive fine analysis in civil forfeiture cases
as long as the fine imposed was, in part, punitive.9 Excessive fine analysis may even
find its way into BMW punitive damage defenses as well.'0
II. CIVIL PRACTICE CASES AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR
Civil Practice offered another non-business venuefor decisions important to the
business community. Three cases were particularly noteworthy: General Electric
Company v. Joiner," Baker v. General Motors Corporation,12 and Lexecon, Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach.13
In Joiner, the Supreme Court revisited the expert testimony issue for the first
time since its landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 14
In Daubert, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence impose upon the trial
court the duty to act as "gatekeeper" to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony
or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable."' 5  At the same time, the
Daubert Court made clear that this duty did not extend to an evaluation of the
comment on the $15,000 fine ordered by the District Court, an issue not raised on appeal. See id. at 2038.
A vigorous dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, found the Thomas' opinion misguided in theory and flawed in application. Seeid.at 2046. The dissent argued
that the majority's failure to deferto the legislature placed courts in the untenable predicament of ignoring the legislative
conclusion that an across-the-board forfeiture is necessary where, as here, it is exceedingly difficult to connect currency
with illegal activity. See id. at 2044. Hence, the dissent would have applied the forfeiture statute, in full, to any willful
violation of the reporting statute. See id. at 2045.
7. The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, norcrel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
8. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2035. Bajakajian involved a criminal in personam forfeiture. See id.
9. See id. at 2035 n.6 (citing Austria v. U.S., 509 U.S. 602,621-22 (1993)).
10. In BMW v. Gore, the Court invalidated a punitive damages award as grossly excessive and, therefore, in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,585-86 (1996)
(for an analysis of that case, see Barbara K. Bucholtz, Taking Care ofBusiness: A Review ofBusiness-Related Cases
in the 1995-1996 Supreme Court Term, 32 TULSA L.J. 449, 452 (1997)). Like Bajakajian, and its precedent-setting
Constitutional limitation of forfeitures, BMW was the first time a punitive damage award had been struck down on
Constitutional grounds. See id. A survey of recent trial court decisions reveals BMW's defining influence in framing
the analysis for claims of excessive punitive awards. That analytical framework, like the grossly disproportionate test
in Bajakajian, requires the reviewing court to compare, inter alia, the gravity of the defendant's offense (measured by
the jury's compensatory award) with the amount of the punitive award. See id. at 575; see Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at
2036. Fora summary of U.S. district court opinions applying the BMW framework, see Samuel A. Thumma, Damages,
NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997 at B5. The analogue between Bajakajian's Constitutional considerations under Eighth
Amendment analysis, and those of BMW under the Fourteenth Amendment, portend the emergence of interesting
defenses by business against government claims for forfeiture and fines under reporting statutes and against plaintiffs'
compensatory and punitive damage claims.
11. 118 S. Ct.512 (1997).
12. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
13. 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
14. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. Id. at 589.
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credibility or weight of that testimony or evidence.' 6 Those evaluations are strictly
within the purview of the jury.' 7  In Joiner, the Court was asked to address a
question not resolved by Daubert: what standard of review should appellate courts
apply to a trial court's exercise of its Daubert duty? 8 In Joiner, the eponymous
plaintiff sought damages from a former employer for the cancer he claimed he
developed in his work-related exposure to PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls). 9 The
trial court found that Joiner's expert witnesses were unable to link their conclusions
that his exposure to PCB on the job promoted the development of his cancer, with the
epidemiological animal studies upon which they claimed to rely.20 Because the
studies did not support the experts' analysis, their testimony was excluded.2' The
appellate court reversed on two grounds: first, the Federal Rules of Evidence express
a distinct preference for admission of evidence; and, second, it was up to the jury, not
the judge, to choose between competing theories as long as any evidence in the record,
including expert testimony, supported the theory.22 Writing for the majority, the
Chief Justice determined that the proper standard of review for a Daubert challenge
was an abuse of discretion standard.' This determination is simply an application
of the general rule that a trial court's evidentiary rulings should be reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.24 Applying the standard to the Joiner case, the Chief
Justice found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the experts'
testimony. The trial court's ruling was consistent with its gatekeeper role to ensure
that scientific testimony is reliable.26 Because none of the animal studies cited by the
experts demonstrated that PCBs promote the kind of small-cell cancer Joiner
developed, those studies "were not a sufficient basis for the experts' opinions."27
Hence the experts could point to no evidence suggesting that their opinions were
reliable as scientific evaluations. 28
The Joiner opinion converts the Daubert reliability test into an effective
evidentiary weapon for businesses defending themselves in toxic tort or product
liability litigation. It might also be employed to challenge economic theory in
antitrust cases.29 In addition, it gives trial courts guidance in sorting through the
problematic arena of tort liability premised upon the dangers of manufactured
substances which are otherwise useful to a modem industrialized society. Joiner is
16. See id.
17. See Joiner, 1lS S. Ct. at518.
18. See id. at515.
19. See id. at516.
20. See id.
21. See id. at518.
22. See id. at 516 (citing Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524,529-33 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
23. See General Electric Co. v.Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997).
24. See id. (citing Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647 n.l (1997) as the most recent of a line of cases
dating back to 1878 which applied this general rule).
25. See id.at 519.
26. See id. at 517.
27. Id. at 518.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Charles Weller, Antitrust, NAT'LLJ., August 24, 1998 at B6, col.l.
210 [Vol. 34:207
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not the last word on Daubert. Next term, in an Eleventh Circuit case, the Court will
be asked to decide whether Daubert applies to technical and experiential expertise,
or whether it is limited to traditional notions of scientific expertise. That case,
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,30 will resolve a split in the circuits on the issue.
Industry has argued strenuously that Daubert should also apply to testimony
premised upon technical expertise.3'
Another evidentiary issue resolved by the Court this term will influence business
litigation. In Baker v. GeneralMotors Corporation, the Court held that a permanent
injunction, to which both parties stipulated in a case brought in one state was not
enforceable in the courts of another state under full faith and credit analysis.32 The
full faith and credit issue was implicated by the interrelationship of three different
lawsuits in three different states.3 Ronald Elwell, a GM employee who specialized
in the problem of vehicular fires often testified on behalf of his employer, GM, in
products liability litigation.34 Elwell eventually left GM under less than amicable
circumstances.35 Subsequently, Elwell was deposed in a Georgia products liability
case involving a fire in a GM pickup truck's fuel system.36 In the Georgia case,
Elwell testified on behalf of the plaintiff over GM's objections.37 Shortly thereafter,
Elwell sued GM in Michigan alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge.38
GM counterclaimed alleging breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful disclosure of
confidential information in connection with Elwell's testimony in the Georgia case.39
The parties reached a settlement which included an agreement to stipulate to the entry
of a permanent injunction, foreclosing Ellwell's testimony against GM in any
litigation and his disclosure of confidential information obtained during the course of
his GM employment.' The injunction made an exception for the pending Georgia
case.
4 1
In the Baker case, plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against GM in
Missouri alleging that their mother, a passenger in a Chevrolet Blazer, died as the
result of an engine fire caused by an allegedly faulty fuel pump in the Blazer.42 The
Bakers subpoenaed Elwell as a deponent and an expert witness and, over GM's
objections, the federal district court held his testimony could be compelled. 43 The
court's ruling was premised, in part, on the public policy exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.44 The Eighth Circuit reversed primarily on the basis that,
30. Carmichael v. Samyong Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (1 lth Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
31. See Marcia Coyle, Class Actions, "Daubert" Top of '98-'99 Docket, NAT'LLJ., October 5, 1998, at B 1.
32. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 666-67 (1998).
33. See id. at 661-62.
34. See id. at 660-61.
35. See id.at 661.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 661 (1998).
39. See id. at 658.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 662-63.
42. See id. at 662.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 662-63.
1999]
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assuming a public policy exception, Missouri's public policy favored full faith and
credit.45 In a lengthy exegesis on full faith and credit jurisprudence, which four
concurring justices declined to follow, Justice Ginsburg ruled that full faith and credit
makes final judgments in one state conclusive evidence in sister states. It does not
extend beyond final judgments to include the kind of injunction at issue in Baker;
injunctions which "interfere with litigation over which the ordering state had no
authority."' 6 The concurring justices found the injunctions exception fashioned by
Ginsburg to be both unnecessary and ill-advised. They found sufficient grounds for
the Court's holding under existing doctrine and narrower analysis. Under traditional
Full Faith and Credit analysis, the initial inquiry is whether the state where the
injunction was issued would give it preclusive effect.47 GM failed to meet its burden
of showing that Michigan would give the injunction preclusive effect. Justice
Kennedy, in his concurrence, in which Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined, found
that under existing Michigan precedent it was reasonable to conclude that Michigan
would not give preclusive effect to an injunction which would bind the Bakers, who
were not parties to the Michigan case.' According to Justice Kennedy, traditional
analysis obviates the necessity of fashioning broad exceptions to full faith and credit
analysis of the issue.49 Ginsburg reasoned that:
Michigan's judgment, however, cannot reach beyond the Elwell-GM controversy
to control proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties,
asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. Michigan has
no power over those parties, and no basis for commanding them to become
interveners in the Elwell-GM dispute. Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority
to control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers to
the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are
competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search
for the truth. °
Justice Ginsburg's opinion appears to rest on several theories and to introduce
unnecessarily broad exceptions to existing analysis. Future litigants should anticipate
a narrower, fact specific resolution of the issue.
The third Civil Practice case implicating important business interests was
Lexecon.5 In that case, Justice Souter delivered the virtually unanimous opinion52
45. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662).
46. Baker, 118S. Ct.at665.
47. See id. at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "If the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior
judgment, 'the courts ofthe United States can accord it no greater efficacy'" Id., (citing Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306,
313 n.6 (1983) (quoting Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71,75 (1903))).
48. See Baker, 118 S. CL at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 666.
51. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
52. See id. at 958. Justice Scaliajoined Souter's opinion except forPart I .C which analyzed the relevant legislative
history and found it to be inconclusive on the issue but suggestive of the Court's conclusion that a pretrial assignment
does not confer authority on the assignee court to try the case, as well. See id at 963-64.
[Vol. 34.207
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of the Court that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not confer upon a court assigned to
conduct pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigation the authority to then assign the
trial to itself.53 The instant cause of action arose out of a previous class action
against Charles Keating, the American Continental Corporation and its subsidiary,
Lincoln Savings and Loan and other defendants, including Lexecon, Inc., a consulting
firm charged with giving bank regulators misleading information about the corporate
parent's and subsidiary's financial condition. 4 Several other cases were consolidated
with that case and transferred to federal court in Arizona for pretrial proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).5 Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases that share common factual issues "to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings," '56 but imposes a duty on
the Panel to remand any such action to the original district at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial proceedings.57 During pretrial proceedings in the Arizona court, the
class action parties reached a settlement including the dismissal of all claims against
Lexecon.58
Subsequently, Lexecon filed suit in Illinois alleging that Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach and Cotchett, Illston & Pitre (here, collectively, "Milberg"), law
firms in the class action against Lincoln S&L, et al., had defamed, maliciously
prosecuted, and otherwise engaged in tortious activity against Lexecon.59 Upon
motion by Milberg, the Lexecon claim was transferred to Arizona for consolidation
with the remaining claims in the class action.6' The Arizona judge assigned to pre-
trial proceedings in the Lexecon litigation dismissed two of the state law claims but
deferred ruling on Milberg's summary judgment motions pending the completion of
discovery.6' He also deferred ruling on Lexecon's motion to refer the case back to
the Panel for remand to the Illinois court and Milberg's cross motion that the Arizona
court retain the case and self-assign the trial to itself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a).62 Section 1404 gives trial courts authority to transfer cases to serve the ends
of justice and the convenience of the parties. 63 The Arizona court subsequently
granted Milberg's § 1404 motion, denied Lexecon's motion to refer, and granted
Milberg's summary judgment motion on all remaining issues except a defamation
claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted an apparent conflict in the applicable law
but ruled in favor of Milberg's § 1404 motion for self-assignment. 64 The remaining
defamation claim was tried in the Arizona Court and resolved in favor of Milberg.
65
53. See id. at 958.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 961.
57. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,961 (1998).
58. See id. at 958.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,961 (1998).
64. See id. at 958.
65. See id.
1999]
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Lexecon appealed, asserting that the Arizona court should have referred the case to
the Panel for trial assignment, but Lexecon did not challenge Arizona's jurisdiction
to self-assign.66 A divided Ninth Circuit affirmed the Arizona district court on all
counts.67 The circuit's majority opinion noted that the Panel's Rule 14(b) provided
support for Arizona's self-assignment by permitting the transferee court to order a
case transferred to itself or another district court.68 The majority also sought support
for its interpretation in the relatively common practice of self-assignment sanctioned
in other circuits. 69
In reversing, the Supreme Court invoked the plain meaning rule: "If language
is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect" and "words are to be taken in their
ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms or words of art."7 The Court found
the relevant term "shall" in § 1407(a) to be plain, unambiguous and-according to
its ordinary meaning-mandatory in the following provision: "Each action so
transferred shall be transferred by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred...." 7 1
In findingno latitude for self-assignment in the provision, Souter opined, "If we
do our job at reading the Statute whole, we have to give effect to this p1pin
command." Invoking another canon of statutory construction, that the provisions
of a statute must be construed together,73 Justice Souter rejected Milberg's argument
that § 1407 addresses the Panel's authority while § 1404 addresses the assignee
court's authority.74 Such a construction creates an inherent contradiction in the law
and "rejects that central tenet of interpretation, that a statute is to be considered in all
its parts when construing any one of them."' Premised upon these fundamental rules
of statutory construction the court refused to entertain Milberg's invitation to read
fine distinctions and to draw subtle inferences from the plain meaning of § 1407's
"straightforward language imposing the Panel's responsibility to remand.... 76
Businesses involved in multidistrict litigation may or may not draw comfort
from this bright line ruling which abrogates existing precedent in some jurisdictions.
However, the decision's rationale is illustrative of the Court's preference in business-
related cases and cases in other fields that impact the business community, for
methodical application of settled canons for construing legislative intent, for drawing
issues narrowly, and for rendering opinions which eschew broad policy considerations
and unchartered constitutional analysis.
As noted at the outset of this article,7 with the exception of employment cases
66. See id. at 959-60.
67. See id. at 960.
68. See id. at 961.
69. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,963 (1998).
70. Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 403-04 and accompanying text.
71. Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at962.
72. Id.
73. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 402 and accompanying text.
74. See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 963.
75. Id. at 962.
76. Id. at 964.
77. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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raising sexual harassment or discrimination issues, most business cases avoided
issues of broad public appeal.7" And the decisions rendered in business-related cases
78. Indeed, several cases have little appeal to the business community, generally, because the issues raised were
exclusively germane to a particular industry or a narrow issue only tangentially related to the business sector at large.
For example, in AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 118 U.S. 1956 (1998), a purchaser of "bulk" long
distance services for subsequent resale to end users of the services contracted with a long-distance services provider for
services. See id. at 1959. The provider, a "common carrier" under the Communications Act, must file "schedules" or
"tariffs" of all of its charges with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pursuant to § 203 of the Act. See
id. Additionally, the FCC requires common carriers to charge resellers, like the purchaser, the same rates, under the
same conditions, it applies to other customers. See id. at 1959, construed in 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). The purchaser
experienced significant problems under the contract and eventually it withdrew from the contract before it expired and
filed suit in federal court alleging certain state law claims including breach of contract and of implied covenants ofgood
faith and fair dealing arising from provider's failure to meet certain obligations it undertook in addition to those which
were identified in its filed tariff. See id. at 1961. The appellate court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the purchaser
on the state law claims and, like the trail court, rejected the provider's counterclaim that the state law claims were pre-
empted by the Communications Act's filed tariff provisions at § 203. See id. at 1962. The Supreme Court reversed
on the basis that all of the purchaser's claims were covered by, and therefore preempted by, the Act. See id. at 1965.
The Court ruled that, under the filed-rate doctrine, a purchaser may not claim that preferential treatment should be
accorded to it. See id. at 1963. Its exclusive remedy is found at § 202 of the Act which precludes claims for services
not included in provider's filed-tariff. See id. at 1963-64.
In a case relevant to businesses that contract with Native American tribes, the Supreme Court held that the
contracting tribe was subject to suit on the contract only where Congress had authorized the suit or when the tribe had
expressly waived its sovereign immunity. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 U.S.
1700, 1705 (1998). Sovereign immunity is not limited to activities within Indian territory but extends to the tribe's
commercial relationships beyond that territory. See id. at 1701. While the broad sweep of tribal immunity is not
supported by "a reasoned statement of doctrine" in precedent cases, and while "[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom
of perpetuating the doctrine," in deference to Congressional failure to abrogate it, the Court elected to apply it. Id. at
1703-04. For an expanded discussion of Supreme Court decisions relating to Native Americans during this term, see
Judith V. Royster, Decontextualizing Federal Indian Law: The Supreme Court's 1997-98 Term, 34TutSAL.J. 329
(1999).
In a mortgagee foreclosure action, the Supreme Court held that the right to rescind under the Truth-in-Lending
Act, expired, under the terms of that Act, three years after the loan agreement was executed. See Beach v. Ocwon Fed.
Bank, 118 S. Ct. 1408, 1409 (1998). Thereafter, rescission could not be raised as an affirmative recoupment defense
by mortgagor to mortgagee's foreclosure action. See id. The terms of § 1635(f) of the Act provide that "the obligor's
right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction" making clear the legislative
intent that the right is extinguished after the designated three year period, hence it is not merely a limitation of actions
statute precluding use of the right to bring suit after three years; the limitation extinguishes its use as a defense to
foreclosure as well. 15 U.S.C. §1635(0; see also Beach, 118 S. Ct. at 1411.
Judgment creditors can take some comfort from the Court's opinion in United States v. Estate ofRomani, where
the Court resolved an apparent conflict between the federal priority statute (which provides, at31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) that
federal tax claims should be "paid first" from the assets of decedent's estate which are insufficient to cover all of
decedent's debts) and the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (which provides that federal tax liens are
not valid against other lien holders or secured creditors, unless appropriately filed with the authorities designated by §
6323(f(1)(13)). See United States v. Estate of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478, 1480-81 (1998). The Court sought to
harmonize the apparent conflict by reading the priority statute as governed by Congressional policy embodied in
amendments of the tax lien statute which have the effect of offering secured creditors and non-governmental lien holders
some protection against tax liens of which they have no notice. See id. at 1486. Thus, an unrecorded federal tax lien
has no priority over a judgment lien previously perfected under state law. See id. at 1488.
In another tax case, the Court adopted an agency interpretation of a statutory term as reasonable when there was
no definitional statute and no plain meaning of the subject term. See Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 118 U.S. 1413, 1415 (1998). The case concerned the"fresh start" provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. See id. Prior to the 1986 Act, property and casualty (PC) insurers were permitted a full deduction for
estimates of losses incurred but unpaid ("loss reserves"). See id. However, the 1986 Act required PC insurers to
discount unpaid losses to present value which would have the effect of underestimating 1986 loss reserves. See id. at
1415-16. Section 1023(e)(3)(A) provided a transitional rule permitting PC insurers to exclude the difference between
undiscounted and discounted 1986 loss reserves from taxable income. See id. at 1415. But the "fresh start" provision
excepted "reserve strengthening" from the loss reserve exclusion. See id. at 1417-18. Regulations promulgated by the
Treasury Department defined "reserve strengthening" as an amount added to "an unpaid loss reserve in a taxable year
beginning in 1986." Id. Finding that there was no plain meaning of the term "reserve strengthening" in general usage
or in the insurance industry and no applicable definition in other federal statutes, the Court found the Treasury's
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exhibit a notable preference for judicial restraint.
Key business cases in the recent term addressed issues in environmental law,'
9
intellectual property," benefits8 and other employment issues, 2 debtor-creditor law,83
antitrust,84 and export law.85 These cases are considered important because they
affect a broad range of business interests.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A major pro-business decision was enunciated in United States v. Bestfoods.86
In that case, the Court considered the extent of a parent corporation's liability for the
costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites created by a subsidiary, pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).87 Section 107(a)(2) of the Act provides that "any person who at the time
interpretation was entitled to deference because it appeared to be a reasonable accommodation between the competing
interests of fairness to the PC industry on the one hand and the capacity of the service to administer its provisions
without permitting abuse through unwarranted padding of 1986 loss reserves, on the other hand. See id.
In a credit union case, the Court struck down an agency in National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank
&Trust Co., and entered the competitive fray between commercial banks and credit unions. See National Credit Union
Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 U.S. 927 (1998). The Court first addressed a threshold issue and held
that banking associations had standing to challenge an agency interpretation of federal legislation governing credit
unions because, as competitors of credit unions, they were within the zone of interests "arguably to be protected" by the
legislation. Id. at 933 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702, § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act). The National Credit Union
Administration interpreted § 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act to permit credit unions to have members in unrelated
employment groups as long as each group shared a common associational bond. Seeid.at930. Section 109,however,
expressly states that "[flederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond ofoccupation
or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community or rural district." Id. at 930.
Banking associations filed suit alleging that the agency interpretation was contrary to the express provisions of
the applicable law. See id. Following a lengthy procedural history, the case reached the Supreme Court. It ruled on
the merits that when the agency interpretation has failed to "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress," its interpretation must be rejected. Id. at 938 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Court found Congress intended that membersofcredit unions have a common
employment-related geographical bond. See id. at 939. That intent was unambiguously expressed in the statute;
therefore, the agency interpretation was in error. See id. at 938-39. The Court buttressed its conclusion by application
of well-settled canons of statutory construction: finding the agency interpretation impermissibly renders the term
"common bond" surplusage and violates the canon that similar language within a statue must be given the same
meaning. See id. at 939.
As this brief synopsis indicates, the common denominator among these otherwise disparate cases is the Court's
distinct preference for the exercise ofjudicial restraint through the use of the canons of statutory construction to resolve
business-related disputes.
79. See UnitedStatesv.Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876(1998); Steel Co. v. Citizens fora Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003
(1998).
80. See Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125 (1998); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998).
8 1. See Eastern Enter. v. ApFel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998); Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998);
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997).
82. See Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998); Allentown Mack Sales and Serv. v. NLRB, 118
S. Ct. 818 (1998); Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division AVCO Corp. v. United Auto. Implement Workers
of Am. Local 787, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998).
83. See Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Fink, 118 S. Ct. 651 (1998); Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212 (1998);
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
84. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
85. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1290 (1998).
86. 118S. Ct. 1876.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1995).
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of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility" may be liable
for cleanup costs."8 A unanimous Court followed well-settled principles of corporate
governance law and ruled that liability for the clean-up of subsidiary-generated waste
sites attached only in one of two situations.
A. Derivative Liability
Because of the fundamental principle that a parent corporation is not liable for
the acts of its subsidiaries, a parent is only derivatively liable under circumstances
which call for the piercing of the corporate veil pursuant to state law. Vicarious
liability, then, attaches whenever the parent uses the subsidiary as a sham "to
perpetrate fraud or subvert justice."'9 Thus, pursuant to traditional canons of
statutory construction, state common law principles (like the rule that derivative
liability of a parent corporation attaches only where the corporate veil should be
pierced) can only be abrogated by a statute that directly addresses the subject matter
of the common law rule. Because CERCLA does not address this fundamental
common law rule, it is unchanged by CERCLA.90 Therefore when (but only when)
the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be charged with indirect,
vicarious, or derivative CERCLA liability for subsidiary actions.9 "Hombook law"
dictates that neither control through ownership of subsidiary stock nor duplication of
the membership of the two corporate boards or their management creates the
necessary predicate for piercing the veil in order to reach the parent.92
B. Direct Liability:
A parent may be liable for its own actions in controlling the polluting facility.
"Under the plain language of the statute, any person who operates a polluting facility
is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution. 9 3 Put another way,
parenthood is no shield from liability where the parent "operates" the facility.94 Thus,
a parent who meticulously observes all corporate formalities with its subsidiary but
directly supervises and controls the operations of the subsidiary's polluting facility
is directly liable under CERCLA.95 In defining the CERCLA term "operating," the
Court was at pains to make a clear distinction between control of the subsidiary,
which may give rise to derivative liability, and control of facility operations, which
may result in direct liability. By blurring the two kinds of liability, the district court
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1995).
89. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.
90. See id. at 1885.
91. See id.at 1886.
92. See id.at 1884.
93. Id. at 1886.
94. See id.
95. See United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. CL 1876, 1886 (1998).
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failed to make this critical distinction. 6 The Sixth Circuit also erred in limiting direct
liability to exclusive or joint venture involvement. CERCLA mandates no such
formal arrangement. Rather, direct liability for "operating" the polluting facility
requires a fact-driven inquiry into the specific activities of parental personnel and an
assessment of whether those activities meet "accepted norms of parental oversight of
a subsidiary's facility., 9 7 "Activities that involve the facility but which are consistent
with the parent's investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary's performance,
... finance and capital budget decisions and articulation of general policies should
not give rise to direct liability."9" However, activities by parental supervisors or dual
officers that serve the interests of the parent at the expense of the subsidiary are a
benchmark of direct involvement.' The contextual background of Bestfoods was the
familiar tale of a failed polluting subsidiary whose polluted real estate was sold and
resold, each transaction creating yet another level or source of potential liability.
Faced with the liability labyrinth created by these transactions, circuits were split on
the reach of parental liability under CERCLA.'0 Bestfoods resolves the split and,
in so doing, meets the expectations of the business community by extending principles
of longstanding corporate governance to a major piece of federal legislation in the
environmental arena.
The other noteworthy environmental case, Steel Company v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, held that the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 did not confer standing on citizen-
plaintiffs for past violations of the Act by a steel company that rectified its violations
prior to the filing of the citizen suit.' While six concurring justices objected to
Justice Scalia's fashioning of the rationale under Article III standing as a mandatory
threshold issue, all justices agreed that the courts had no jurisdiction, under the plain
language of the statute, to hear a citizen suit for wholly past violations. 2
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The major intellectual property case this term has serious implications for
international trade. In Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research Int'l Ins., the Court
shunned policy arguments and, in a tightly woven tapestry of textual analysis that
cross-referenced relevant sections of the Copyright Act of 1976, found that the Act
did not protect the copyright owner from imported copies.0 L'Anza, a producer of
upscale hair care products, marketed its products domestically through exclusive
96. See id. at 1887-89.
97. Id. at 1889.
98. Id. (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation ofthe Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 223,282 (1994)).
99. SeeBestfoods, ll8S. Ct.at 1889.
100. See id.at 1884.
101. See Steel, 118 S. CL at 1020.
102. See id. at 1020-32
103. See Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research Int'l Ins., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1131-33 (1998).
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retailers and by advertising in trade magazines.' °4 The exclusivity arrangements
apparently allowed L'Anza to charge high prices for its products." 5 L'Anza
maintained its exclusivity by copyrighting the labels that appear on its products.'
°6
L'Anza also marketed its products abroad, but at a much lower price and
without extensive promotion. 0 7 In this case, L'Anza's United Kingdom distributor
resold the products to a Malta distributor who, in turn, sold them to Quality King
who imported them into the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized
retailers.'03 These imports undercut the exclusivity of L'Anza products upon which
it relied for its domestic pricing policies."°9 L'Anza brought suit alleging Quality
King's importation activities violated L'Anza's exclusive right to distribute its
products under its copyrighted labels.o"0 Noting that the case was unusual because
L'Anza sought copyright protection for its marketing policy rather than for its
copyrighted labels, the Court commenced its rigorous statutory analysis of the issue
with 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). "' This section gives a copyright owner the exclusive right
to distribute its copyrighted material but the right is expressly limited by the
provisions in §§ 107 through 120 of the Act." 2 In that regard, § 109(a) provides
that, notwithstanding the exclusive right granted by § 106(3), the owner of a lawfully
made copy of the copyrighted material is entitled to sell the copy without the
permission of the copyright owner. '3 Section 109(a) codifies the "first sale" doctrine
enunciated in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 14 where the Court held that the exclusive
right to sell is limited to the "first sale" of the copyrighted material.' L'Anza
acknowledged that, because of the "first sale" doctrine, it would have no recourse
under the Act against domestic distributors who purchased copies lawfully made
under the Act." 6 But it argued that imported copies were covered by § 602(a) of the
Act. "7 That section protects L'Anza's domestic marketing strategy from subversion
by imported and discounted copies." 8 Hence, the issue before the court was whether
the right granted by § 602(a) is also limited by the provisions of §§ 107 through 120
and, thus, by the "first sale" doctrine described in § 109(a). 119
Employing various tools of statutory construction, the Court stated that §
602(a)'20 provides in relevant part, "[i]mportation into the United States, without the
104. See id. at 1127.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1128.
109. See Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research and Int'l Ins., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (1998).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1128.
112. See id. at 1129.
113. See id. at 1128.
114. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
115. See Quality King Distrib., 118 S. Ct. at 1126.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1130-31.
118. Seeid.
119. See id. at 1127.
120. See id. at 1127, 1133-34.
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authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies ... that have'been
acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute... under Section 106... ,,12' Thus, the Court said § 602(a) does not
prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted materials, it simply deems such
importation an infringement of the owner's § 106 rights. But, as noted earlier, § 106
rights are limited by §§ 107 through 120 and include, therefore, the limitation of the
"first sale" doctrine of § 109. Since the limited right to exclusivity under § 106 "does
not encompass resales by lawful owners, the literal text of § 602(a) is simply
inapplicable to both domestic and foreign owners of L'Anza's products who decide
to import them and subsequently resell them in the United States."'22 The Court
rejected L'Anza's arguments and those of the Solicitor General, as amicus curiae.23
It specifically refused to view § 602's reference to § 106 as surplus language. Rather,
it employed the canon that all sections of the Act must be construed as consistent if
possible. 24 The Court also invoked the plain meaning rule. "2 It expressly refused
to be drawn into arguments about the wisdom of congressional failure to protect
domestic producers from imports of copyrighted materials not authorized by the
copyright owner.'" The Court stated that such debates are not "relevant to our duty
to interpret the text of the Copyright Act."'2 7
A similar exercise in textual construction resolved another dispute over the
Copyright Act. In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., the Court held that
the use of the term "court" in § 504(c) of the Act, when taken in conjunction with the
use of the term in other sections, suggests that Congress intended the term "court" to
mean the judge rather than the jury.'" Therefore the Copyright Act did not grant a
statutory right to ajury trial on the assessment of statutory damages. 29 Nevertheless,
the Court ruled that, under longstanding constitutional analysis, the copyright owner
is entitled to a jury trial, including a jury determination of the damages, under the
Seventh Amendment. 3 ' Historically, copyright damage claims were tried by juries;
therefore these claims were covered by the amendment.' 3 '
V. BENEFITS AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 13 2
In Geissal v. Moore Medical Corporation, the Court applied the plain meaning
rule to the question of whether federal law requires an employer to give a terminated
121. Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research and Int'l, Ins., 118 S. Ct. 1125, 1130 (1998).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1134.
124. See id. at 1131-32.
125. See id. at 1133.
126. See id. at 1127, 1133.
127. Id. at 1134.
128. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1283 (1998).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1288.
131. See id.
132. Discrimination and sexual harassment cases are discussed supra note 2.
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qualified employee continuation health insurance coverage, even if he was also
covered by his wife's group plan at the time he elected continuation coverage.133 The
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) amended the Employer
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to provide that a employee covered
by an employer's health plan may elect continued coverage after certain "qualifying
events" such as termination. 34 The employee in the instant case elected continued
coverage prior to his termination. 35 At the time of election, he was also covered by
his wife's group health plan.'36 Over the employer's objection, the Court found that
the plain meaning of the relevant provision, § 1162(2)(d) of COBRA, gave the
employee continued coverage because on the date of his election he was already
covered by his wife's plan.'37 The relevant portion of § 1162(2)(D) states that
COBRA coverage may cease on "[t]he date on which qualified beneficiary first
becomes, after the date of the election.., covered under any other group health
plan."' 38 The Court found "no justification for disparaging the clarity of [that
Section]."' 39
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
Corporation of California resolved a statute of limitations dispute under the Multi-
Employer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980 (MPPAA).'40 The MPPAA requires
employees who withdraw from an underfunded plan to pay a withdrawal assessment
to the fund either in a lump sum prepayment, or according to an installment schedule
established by the trustees of the Fund. 141 If the employer fails to meet its obligation
in this regard, the MPPAA, at 29 U.S.C. § 1451(f)(1), provides that the Fund has
a cause of action against the employer. 42 However, the right to bring the cause is
subject to a six-year statute of limitations.' 43 The statute of limitations runs,
according to § 1451(f)(6) "from the date on which the cause of action arose."'" The
question before the Court was when the limitation period began to run on the Fund's
cause of action. 45 Using traditional doctrine to ascertain the applicable date, the
Court found that a cause arises when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief."
In the absence of indications that Congress intended another triggering date, the Court
determined that the cause arises, not when the employer withdraws from the fund, but
when the employer first defaults on the installment payment schedule established by
133. See Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp. 118 S. Ct. 1869, 1874 (1998).
134. See id. at 1872-73.
135. See id.at 1871.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 1875-76.
138. Id. at1871.
139. Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1869, 1876 (1998).
140. See Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 118 S. Ct. 542, 545
(1997).
141. See id.
142. Seeid.
143. See id.at549.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 545.
146. See Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 118 S. Ct. 542, 549
(1997).
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the Fund. 47 Actions filed after that date are not entirely barred but installment
payments due more than six years prior to the filing of the suit are not recoverable."n8
In an unusual takings case, the Supreme Court held that an economic regulation,
such as the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act"), can effect
an unconstitutional taking when, as in the instant case, "the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectation and the
character of the government action" offends notions of "justice and fairness.' ' 49
Applying this three-pronged test to the case of Eastern Enterprises. v. Apfel, "0 the
Court found that the assessments imposed on coal operators to create a new employer
benefit fund under the Coal Act imposed a significant economic burden on Eastern
Enterprise ($50 to $100 million) far in excess of its proportional relationship to the
present plan. 5' Considering the facts that it withdrew from mining operations in
1965, that it did not participate in the formulation of subsequent benefit plans, and
that during its mining operation years benefits were insubstantial compared with
today's benefits, the assessment creates a substantial interference with Eastern's
reasonable investment-based expectations. 5 2 Thus the government action here
"implicates fundamental principles of fairness underlying the takings clause," and the
Act's assessment against Eastern "effects an unconstitutional taking."''5 3
The Court considered three other employment cases as well. In Air Line Pilots
Association v. Miller, the Court ruled that nonunion employees can challenge the
amount of a fee the union charges for representing them without having to exhaust
their administrative remedies in arbitration before filing suit.' a It found no legal
basis for compelling exhaustion where, as here, nonunion members had not agreed to
arbitrate. 55
In Allentown Mack Sales and Services v. National Labor Relations Board, the
Court reversed an NLRB decision finding that an employer lacked a good-faith
reasonable doubt as to its employees' support of the union; therefore its internal poll
of the employees constituted an unfair labor practice. 5 6 The Court reviewed the
employer's circumstantial evidence in support of its assertion that it had a good-faith
reasonable doubt and found that evidence incontrovertibly established the employer's
good-faith reasonable doubt. 57 The Court also reviewed the Board's reasonable
doubt and good-faith standard, and a deeply divided Court found it to be consistent
with the Act. 58
The Court considered the jurisdictional reach of the Labor Management
147. See id.
148. See id. at 552.
149. Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131,2146 (1998).
150. See id.
151. See id. at2149.
152. See id. at2150.
153. Id. at 2153.
154. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n. v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (1998).
155. See id. at 1767.
156. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 823-24 (1998).
157. See id.at 820.
158. See id.at 826.
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Relations Act (LMRA), in Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO
Corp. v. United Auto. Implement Workers of America, Local 787.159 Justice Scalia
authored the opinion of the Court ruling that by its terms, § 187(a) of the LMRA
gave courts subject-matterjurisdiction over"[s]uits for violation of contracts... 2160
But the plain meaning of that statute does not extend to confer jurisdiction over suits
alleging fraudulent inducement to contract.16 1 The Court also refused to consider the
Declaratory Judgment Act, as well as whether there was an alternate source of
jurisdiction, because the facts before it did not give rise to a case or controversy on
the voidability of the contract.
62
VI. DEBTOR-CREDITOR
In construing the Bankruptcy Code, specifically 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a
unanimous Court held in Kawaauhua v. Geiger, that that section only excepts from
discharge, debts "for willful and malicious injury."' 63 Reading the words according
to their plain and ordinary meaning and refusing to interpret the statute in a way that
would render any provision superfluous, the Court found that Kawaauhua's medical
malpractice award against Dr. Geiger was dischargeable because the award was for
negligent or reckless misconduct, not the intentional misconduct characterized by the
terms "willful and malicious."' 64 Thus, it could not be saved by the exception in §
523(a)(6).165
Cohen v. De La Cruz required the Court to interpret another provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).'" That section excepts from bank-
ruptcy discharge "any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by... false pretenses, a false
representation or actual fraud."' 67 The debtor filed for Chapter 7 after a New Jersey
Rent Control administrator ordered him to reimburse his tenants for charges assessed
against them in excess of rent control limits. 6 The tenants argued that, pursuant to
§ 523(a)(2)(A), Bankrupt's reimbursement order was not dischargeable in bankruptcy
nor were treble damages, attorney fees and costs assessed under the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, because his overcharges constituted actual fraud. 69 The debtor
conceded that the "debt" referred to in § 523(a)(2)(A) covered the reimbursement
obligation but he argued it did not cover the treble damages or litigation expenses
159. See Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp v. United Auto. Implement Workers of Am.
Local 787, 118 S.Ct. 1626 (1998).
160. See id.at1629.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1631.
163. Kawaauhua v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
164. See id. at 978.
165. See id.
166. SeeCohenv. DeLaCmz, 118S. Ct. 1212, 1214(1998).
167. Id.
168. See id. at 1215.
169. See id.
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because they were not debts "obtained by... fraud."'"7 The Court, however, found
Bankrupt's construction of the term "debt for" in conflict with its usage in other
provisions of the Code. 17 1 These provisions make it clear that "debt for" means "debt
arising from" or "debt on account of" and, therefore, includes an award of treble
damages for fraud. 72
Fidelity Financial Services v. Fink involved another dispute over the
interpretation of a Bankruptcy Code provision. 173 Under Code § 547(c)(3)(B), a
bankruptcy "trustee may not avoid a security interest for a loan used to acquire the
encumbered property if... the security interest is 'perfected on or before 20 days
after the debtor receives possession of the property."",174 In Fink, a secured creditor
mailed its application to perfect, under Missouri law, twenty-one days after bankrupt
took possession of the encumbered property. The secured creditor argued that
because Missouri law permits lien perfection to relate back to the date of the
transaction if creditor perfects in thirty days, his compliance with Missouri law
constituted perfection under the Code. 175 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling that Missouri law's relation-back provision could not expand the
meaning of the terms of the federal Code at § 547(c)(3)(B): "perfected on or before
20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property."' 76 The creditor's
interpretation of the text was not supported by a straight forward reading of the text,
consideration of related provisions, or legislative history. 1
77
VII. EXPORT LAW
In a short but important decision, the Court, in United States v. United Shoe
Corporation, struck down the Harbor Maintenance Tax's applicability to exports.178
The Export Clause of the Constitution precludes the imposition of a tax on exports:
"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State."'179 The Supreme
Court has previously held, however, that a charge may be assessed against exports
as long as it is merely a "user fee" compensating the government for providing
services and facilities. 80 The Harbor Maintenance Tax imposed a charge calculated
as 0.125 percent of an export's value.' 8' Because the tax was calculated on an ad
valorem basis rather than on the value of government services rendered in connection
with export, the charge resembled an impermissible tax, not a user fee. 82 Applying
170. Id.at 1216-17.
171. See id.at 1217.
172. See Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S.Ct. 1212,1217 (1998).
173. See Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc., v. Fink, 118 S. Ct. 651 (1998).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 653-54.
176. Id. at 652,656.
177. See id. at 655-56.
178. See United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1290 (1998),
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
180. See United Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. at 1292.
181. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4461(a) (West 1998).
182. Id.
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the test for a user fee fashioned in Pace v. Burgess,18 3 that an acceptable charge must
correlate with the value of government services rendered in connection with export,
the Court found that the HMT violated the Export Clause. 4
VIII. ANTI-TRUST
In another short but important decision the Court overruled its longstanding
precedent, Albrecht v. Herald Co.,'85 which held that vertical maximum price fixing
was a per se violation of antitrust law.186 In State Oil Company v. Khan, lessees of
a gas station and convenience store owned by State Oil fell into receivership. 7 The
lessees argued that their business failure was caused by State Oil's imposition of a
vertical maximum price on gasoline charged at lessee's pumps.'88 Under the terms
of the lease, while lessees were free to set their own prices for customers, if the prices
were higher than State Oil's suggested retail price, the overage must be paid to State
Oil.'89 State Oil sold the gasoline to lessees at the suggested retail price less a profit
margin of 3.25 cents per gallon. 9 0 Lessees alleged this arrangement not only insured
business failure but also violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.' 9 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the District Court's summary judgement in favor of State Oil on the basis
that Albrecht held that vertical price fixing was a per se antitrust violation. 9 2 The
Supreme Court reversed and overruled Albrecht.1
93
The analysis developed by the Court in Khan began with express terms of § 1
of the Sherman Act which provides: "[e]very contract, combination . . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade is illegal.' 94 The Court has traditionally interpreted
§ 1 to preclude only unreasonable restraints in spite of the section's plain meaning.' 95
Based upon that interpretation, the Court has historically analyzed most anti-trust
claims under a fact-driven inquiry which requires the Court to ascertain whether the
practice at issue imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition. 96 It has reserved
per se rules for the types of restraints it perceives as having "predictable and
pernicious anti-competitive effect and... limited potential for pro-competitive benefit
.. . .,,97 The Court in Albrecht found vertical maximum price-fixing the type of
restraint that called for a per se rule, not necessarily because it always had an anti-
competitive effect but because it allowed price fixers to discriminate against their
183. 92 U.S. 372 (1876).
184. See United Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. at 1296.
185. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
186. See id. at l5.
187. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 S. Ct. 275,278 (1997).
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 278.
192. See id. at279.
193. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 118 S. Ct. 275, 278,285 (1997).
194. Id. at 278 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
195. See id.at 279.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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dealers and interposed the "perhaps erroneous judgement of a seller for the forces of
the competitive market."'198 However, subsequent case law diminished the strength
of that argument.
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 99 the Court overruled United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,2° and its per se ban on vertical non-price
restraint.2"' The Court opined that a per se ban must be "based upon demonstrable
economic effect rather than, as in Schwinn, upon formalistic line drawing." 2°2 This
decision left Albrecht's rationale in a precarious posture.
Based upon a growing dissatisfaction with per se bans generally, and the
Albrecht ban in particular, theKhan Court reassessed Albrecht's rationale and found
it thin, resting on theoretical propositions rather than demonstrable economic
realities.20 3 Thus, in spite of the venerable doctrine of stare decisis, the Court decided
to overrule Albrecht in the interest of "adapting to changed circumstances and the
lessons of accumulated experience."2' While the overruling of precedent is a rare
event, Khan's decision should be seen not as a radical departure from existing law
but as an update of a clearly outmoded approach in antitrust jurisprudence.
IX. CONCLUSION 205
As has been the case for the past several terms, the Rehnquist Court can be
rated as centrist and moderately pro-business 2 6----pro-business in the sense that it
meets the expectations of the business community with regard to settled aspects of the
law.20 7 But its pro-business posture is clearly moderated, not only in the arena of
employment discrimination and sexual harassment, but also in uncertain areas of the
law where a pro-business decision could not be supported by the Court's preferred
analytical posture of rigorous textual analysis.2'r
The latter point suggests the predominant characteristics of last term's pro-
business decisions. With very few exceptions, the business cases exhibited, if not a
tour de force of statutory construction, then certainly a consistent preference for
judicial restraint. That, of course would be a fitting stance for a reputedly
conservative Court. But is this judicial reticence wholly to be explained by
jurisprudential convictions? As I have suggested in an earlier article,2" 9 there is
198. Id. at 280 (quoting Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152).
199. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
200. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
201. See State Oil Co., 118 S. C. at281.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 282.
204. Id. at 284.
205. A list of this term's business-related cases and their citations, Appendix A, and a topical chart of those cases,
Appendix B, follow this article.
206. See Bucholtz, Taking Care ofBusiness, supra note 10.
207. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998), discussed supra Part III.
208. See, e.g., Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research Int'l Ins., 118 S. Ct. 1125 (1998), discussed supra Part
IV.
209. Bucholtz, Taking Care ofBusiness, supra note 10.
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sufficient evidence in the type of business case the Court selects for review, as well
as its textual analysis, to make the argument that the Court has a very real
preoccupation with forming and maintaining a stabilizing consensus. That, in turn,
would suggest that the ultimate concern of the current Court is to protect the strength
of the Court qua institution, avoiding both cases and interpretative postures that
widen ideological fault lines in the Court and in society. If that is so, then court-
watchers looking for the drama of policy-driven analysis and path breaking
constitutional theory will have to wait for another day.
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APPENDIX A
List of Cases
Antitrust
1. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
Intellectual Property
1. Quality King Distrib. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1125 (1998).
2. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279 (1998).
Environmental Law
1. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
2. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
Employment-Sexual Harassment
1. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
3. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
Employment-Other
1. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
2. Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1761 (1998).
3. Allentown Mack Sales and Serv. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818 (1998).
4. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. United Auto. Implement
Workers of Am. Local 787, 118 S. Ct. 1626 (1998).
5. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
Benefits
1. Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 213 (1998).
2. Bay Area Laundry v. Ferbar Corp, 118 S. Ct. 542 (1997).
3. Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1869 (1998).
Taxation
1. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 118 S. Ct. 1413 (1998).
2. United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1290 (1998).
Debtor/Creditor
1. Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Fink, 118 S. Ct. 651 (1998).
2. Cohen v. De La Cruz, 118 S. Ct. 1212 (1998).
3. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 118 S. Ct. 974 (1998).
Communications
1. AT&T v. Central Office Tel., 118 S. Ct. 1956 (1998).
Native American
1. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998).
Trusts and Estates
1. United States v. Estates of Romani, 118 S. Ct. 1478 (1998).
Civil Practice
1. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
2. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
3. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
Other - Forfeiture and Excessive Fines
1. United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
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